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THE ASSIGNABILITY OF EASEMENTS AND PROFITS
The concept of an interest "running" with particular realty
is employed in connection with assignments of easements and
profits to develop rules which are reasonably clear and free
from dispute in most situations. The burdcn, on the semdent
land passes with such land to all takers thereof. In theory
this end of the easement or profit runs with the servient tene-
ment itself, rather than merely with an estate therein, and hence
is binding upon even adverse possessors of the freehold., The
benefit of an easement appurtenant to some dominant tenement
passes freely therewith even without separate mention.2 The
benefit of a profit appurtenant passes in similar fashion. The only
limitation is that the servient land must not be "surcharged,"
or unduly burdened, by certain transfers as described below.s
The benefit of a profit in gross is freely assignable from one
person to another, subject only to the rule that where assigned
to more than one the new takers must "work together with one
- This article will form part of a book on Real Covenants and Other
Interests that Run with the Land to be published by Callaghan & Co.,
Chicago, Ill.
'See discussion in HOLMES, THE Con=.N LAW (1M81) 082-36; Clark,
The Doctrine of Privity of Estate in Connction. i .tl Rcal Covcnant3
(1922) 32 YALE L. J. 123.
2 See cases cited in 2 TFFANY, RrAL POPERirY (2d ed. 1920) 1227, 1228,
nn. 6, 7, and in 19 C.J. 935, 936. Division of the dominant estate is freely
permitted. Infra note 33.
8 See next paragraph.
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stock" that is, in common as one person.4 But when we come
to easements in gross, a serious difference of opinion exists on
the question whether or not they are transferable. A large
portion of this essay will be devoted to a consideration of this
particular problem.
SURCHARGING A PROFIT APPURTENANT
The rules against surcharging an appurtenant profit, while
somewhat technical in form, have a common sense basis. A
profit ihvolves, in addition to other legal relations, a power of
appropriation of some part or product of the servient estate.,
Unless created as an exclusive profit, the servient owner is also
entitled to make a similar appropriation. The possibilities of
such appropriation, particularly in the old cases of commons
of pasturage where the rules were developed, are in the nature
of things strictly limited by the amount of the available product.
The rules against surcharging operate to prevent the unfair
exploitation by the dominant owner of the servient estate be-
yond what was originally contemplated in the creation of the
profit. Such unfair use may occur when one having a profit
not "admeasurable" or divisible releases part of the servient
estate,. thus claiming the entire profit in the -remainder." The
same result would follow when he attempts to transfer only a
part of the dominant estate 8 or when the title to a part of the
servient estate becomes united with, and thus extinguished by,
the title of the dominant estate., Where such surcharging oc-
curs the penalty is the extinguishment of the easement." It
should be noted that this can occur only by a conveyance of
the kind indicated, and does not arise from mere exercise of
4 Mountjoy's Case, 1 And. 307 (1583); Grubb v. Bayard, Fed. Cas. No.
5849 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1851); Stanton v. Herbert, 141 Tenn. 440, 211 S. W.
353 (1918) (stating, however, that the profit is extinguished) ; Harlow v.
Lake Superior Iron Co., 36 Mich. 105 (1877); cases cited 19 C.J. 870, n. 25;
2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1398. But where the profit is exclusive,
no sudi limitation appears to be made. New Haven v. Hotchkiss, 77 Conn.
168, 58 Atl. 753 (1904); Baker v. Kenney, 145 Iowa 638, 124 N. W. 901
(1910); Chandler v. Hart, 161 Cal. 405, 119 Pac. 516 (1911), Ann. Cas.
1913B 1094.
Comment (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 813, 817.
a Mountjoy's Case; Grubb v. Bayard; Stanton v. Herbert, all supra
note 4.
SRotherham v. Green, Cro. Eliz. 593 (1597).
8Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. 639 (N. Y. 1833); Livingston v.
Ketcham, 1 Barb. 592 (N. Y. 1847); Leyman v. Abeel, 16 Johns. 30 (N. Y.
1819).
9 Tyrringham's Case, 4 Co. 36b (1584); Klimpton v. Wood, 1 And. 159
<1586); Bell v. Ohio & P. R. R., 25 Pa. 161 (1855); Hall v. Lawrence,
2 R. I. 218. (1852) (giving a resum6 of the rules); TIFFANY, op. Cit. mupra
mote 2, at 1398-1400; see Comment' (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 813, 817.
10 Supra notes 7-9.
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the profit. Conveyances where no surcharging occurs are valid.
And where the profit is, by its nature, admeasurable, or capable
of exact division and apportionment according to the area of
the dominant estate, it is not extinguished but apportioned so
that the servient owner is not harmed.-
No similar rule applies to profits in gross. Here there is not
the possibility of surcharging in the manner and form specified,
and protection to the servient owner is afforded by the rule that
new owners may exercise such profit only together as "one
stock." 12
NON-ASSIGNABILITY OF EASEMENTS IN GROSS
As to easements in gross, there is a considerable body of
law holding them unassignable. The usual form of statement
is not free from ambiguity since it does not distinguish between
benefit and burden. The English cases deny assignability to
the benefit. 3 Further it is asserted that they refuse to recog-
nize such easements at all. This is not strictly accurate for
they do hold that an enforcible privilege is created.1 What is
meant is that the burden is ot allowed to pass. The relations
created by the easement are held to involve the original parties
to it alone.15
In this country, in spite of some objection by writers,0 the
burden is quite generally held to pass with the servient land.,-
" 3.Cole v. Foxnan, Noy 30 (1618) ; Drury v. Kent, Cro. Jac. 14 (1603) ;
Daniel v. Hanslip, 2 Lev. 67 (1672); Wild's Case, 8 Co. 78b (1609); eazcs
cited supra notes 7-9.
12Case cited svpra note 4.
13Ackroyd v. Smith, 10 C. B. 164 (1850), is a leading case. See also
authorities cited infra notes 14, 15.
'- See discussion in TiFFAKY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1223, 1224, and
Comment (1923) 32 YALE L. J. S14, 815, citing Lord Cairns in Rangeley
v. Midland Ry., L. R. 3 Eq. 306, 310 (1863); GODDArXD, EASEMENTS (8th
ed. 1921) 10; GALE, EAsn~mTs (9th ed. 1910) 11, 12.
zKing v. Allen, [1916] 2 A. C. 54, aff'g [1915] 2 Ir. R. 443 (advertis-
ing privilege held personal); see Clark, Liccnscs ij Real Property Laz
(1921) 21 COL. L. Rnv. 757; infra, notes 16, 17; DIGBY, HISTOnY OF TH
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (5th ed. 1897) 182, n. 1; cf. Sweet, The Trt
Nature of an Easement (1908) 24 L. Q. REv. 260. In Hill v. Tupper, 2 H.
& C. 121 (1863), an excluaire boating privilege was not protected as against
third persons. The privilege here might well be deemed appurtenant and
not in gross. But see Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Eascmcnt ad Lic,-cc
Cases (1917) 27 YALn L. J. 66, 94, n. 54; Comment (1923) 32 Y,=- L. 3.
813, 814. English cases upholding privileges in gross as against the orig-
inal parties are cited ibid. 815.
16 (1911) 11 COL. L. Ruv. 689, criticising Borough Bill Posting Co. v.
Levy, 144 App. Div. 784, 129 N. Y. Supp. 740 (2d Dept. 1911), where an
injunction to protect an advertising privilege was granted against a sub-
sequent taker of the land.
- Cusack Co. v. Myers, 189 Iowa 190, 178 N. W. 401 (1920), 10 A. L. R.
1104 (1921); Levy v. Louisville Gunning System, 121 Ky. 510, 89 S. W. 523
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Much may be said for this result. It is true that thereby an
encumbrance is placed upon the title and the transfer of the
servient estate is to that extent hindered. But, if the benefit
is not assignable, that burden is definite and certain in favor
of a specific individual and limited in point of time to the life
of the dominant owner. The difficulties noted hereafter as to
the assignability of the benefit do not apply. Moreover, circuity
of action is avoided by allowing a direct action against the
one who has done the acts of obstruction.18 The desirability of
such direct burdens, considered in the light of the servitudes
and restrictions now freely allowed, seem greater than their dis-
advantages as clogs upon land titles.
It is in connection witk the benefit of easements in gross that
the chief question arises in this country. The more usual viewv
is represented by the following quotation of the Michigan Su-
preme Court, taken from an article in Ruling Case Law:
"The great weight of the authorities supports the doctrine
that easements in gross, properly so-called because of their per-
sonal character, are not assignable or inheritable, nor can they
be made so by any terms of the grant." I'
But this view is strongly assailed in several cases and by many
leading text writers.20  It seems to these critics a strange
anomaly that easements in gross should be non-assignable while
as to other similar interests, notably profits in gross, the directly
contrary rule applies.
BASIS OF THE RULE OF NON-ASSIGNABILITY
It is not unusual in our property law to discover rules more
or less arbitrary which say to the realty owner, "Thou shalt
(1905), 1 L. R. A. (N. s.) 359 (1906); Willougby v. Lawrence, 116 Ill. 11,
4 N. E. 356 (1886); cf. Smith v. Dennedy, 224 Mich. 378, 194 N. W. 998
(1923); also supra note 16.
is Cf. cases supra notes 16, 17 with Hill v. Tupper, supra note 15; see
also the discussion as to covenants in gross in Clark, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 128.
19 See Stockdale v. Yerden, 220 Mich. 444, 448, 190 N. W. 225, 226 (1922),
quoting 9 R. C. L. 739; of. also Thomas v. Brooks, 188 Ky. 253, 221 S. W.
542 (1920); (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 94; Atlantic Mills v. New York Cent. R.
R., 221 App. Div. 386, 223 N. Y. Supp. 206 (3d Dept. 1927); Waller v.
Hildebrecht, 295 Ill. 116, 122, 128 N. E. 807, 809 (1920); Tide-water Pipe
Co. v. Bell, 280 Pa. 104, 124 Atl. 351 (1924), 40 A. L. R. 1516 (1926) ; Cad-
walader v. Bailey, 17 R. I. 495, 23 Atl. 20 (1891), 14 L. R. A. 300 (1892) ;
19 C. J. 867; JONES, EASEMENTS (1898) § 39; Comment (1919) 29 YALE,
L. J. 218.
20 2 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1227; Comment (1923) 32 YALE
L. J. 813; Simes, The Assignability of Easements in Gross in American
Law (1924) 22 MIcH. L. Rsv. 521. Among cases taking this point of view
are Goodrich v. Burbank, 12 Allen 459 (Mass. 1866); Standard Oil Co. v.
142
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not." Building line and zoning ordinances are modern develop-
ments and among traditional restrictions may be noted the rule
against perpetuities, the rules as to restraints on alienation and
the rule that an easement or profit may be "abandoned" by act
of the owner without a written transfer. 1 Much objection has
from time to time been voiced against Lord Brougham's famous
dictum that "incidents of a novel kind cannot be devised, and
attached to property, at the fancy or caprice of the owner" as
a fantastic expression of British conservation.22  It is true tlt
this view may easily be carried to absurd extremes. -3 But as
a counsel of caution it has its uses. It expresses an ingrained
view of our law that land interests should be made freely avail-
able for commercial development, that "encumbrances upon
title" should be generally frowned upon, and that the long tying
up of realty and consequent removal of it from the market should
be prevented.24  The general background of arbitrary restric-
tive rules is clear. The test in each case must be as to the
desirability of the particular restriction and resort to generali-
ties in favor of the freedom of will of owners or vendors of
property is of little aid.
Buchi, 72 N. J. Eq. 492, 66 Atl. 427 (1907); and other cases cited in Com-
ment (1923) 32 YAE L. J. 313, 316, n. 2S.
21 For able criticisms of the rule of abandonment see Note (1911) 11
Co. L. REv. 777; see also (1925) 38 HARV. L. R EV. 523; (1925) 34 YA~r,
L. J. 910.
22 See Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517, 535 (1834); Comment (1923)
32 YALE L. J. 813, 814; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. szpra note 2, at 1250, 1257.
23But the English courts have not refused to recognize new property in-
terests. Thus Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in Attorney-General of S. Nigcria
v. Holt, [1915] A. C. 599, 617, quotes Lord St. Leonards in Dyce v. Hay,
1 Macq. 305 (1852), as follows: "The category of servitudes and easemcntU
must alter and expand with the changes that take place in the circumstances
of mankind."
24 This view seems now generally assumed, and no extensive diccus~ion
is had. See cases supra notes 13-15, 19, 22; also cases frowning upon
covenants cited in Clark, op. cit. supra note 1. Boatman v. Lasley, 23 Ohio
St. 614 (1873), discusses the point of devolution of title. See Sims, A
Study of Rights Incident to Realty; The Growth of Li-wtations ,pon
Property Rights (1922) 8 VA. L. REv. 317. The doctrine that titles must
be kept unencumbered and freely marketable was carried far in the Eng-
lish Settled Land Act, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 33 (1832), giving the life tenant of
settled land power to alien the fee, the proceeds being held on the settle-
ment; and it was carried still further in the recent property reform where
such life tenant is made the "estate owner" of the fee. 15 Geo. V, e. 15,
§§ 4 (2), 5, 6, 7; c. 20, § 1 (4), (7) (1925) ; see Bordwell, English Propcrty
Reform and its American Aspects (1927) 37 Y.=I L. J. 1, 2; Bordwell,
Property Reform in England (1925) 11 IowA% L. BuLL. 1, 5; UDEaum-nL, A
CONCeSE EXPLANATION o LoRD BmKENHEAD'S Acr (1922) 29, 32. In fact,
a main purpose of the reform was to render titles more freely marhtable.
Warren, Law of Property Act, 1922 (1923) 21 MiCK. L. Rnv. 245, 251.
23 The same view is advanced in considering covenants and equitable re-
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Now the objections to assignable easements in gross as most
unfortunate encumbrances on title are obvious. Such easements,
usually of small value, and easily forgotten by the holder thereof,
often are discovered many years later just at a time when they
may hold up or prevent an advantageous sale of the servient
estate. Thus, suppose a personal way is granted by A to his
neighbor, B. B as he moves out of the neighborhood is not likely
to think enough about the situation to give a formal release;
and his own death, followed by various marriages, deaths or
changes of residence of his heirs, may put the title, if transfer-
able, in such a shape that no release now is practically possible.
True the rules of abandonment or of adverse possession may
make it possible for A to clear up his title by means of a bill
in equity to quiet title. But even if the necessary defendants
to such a bill are discovered and properly served, the difficulties
of proof, especially if meanwhile the way has been kept open
by the servient owner, are heavy. Meanwhile the prospectiye
purchaser has gone elsewhere. Contrast this situation with that
of an easement appurtenant to some dominant land. The latter
is an interest hardly to be overlooked either upon death or re-
moval elsewhere of the owner. Consequently it and the appur-
tenant easement will pass to some definitely ascertainable person.
The encumbrance is therefore easily traced to some one capable
of giving a release, or against whom abandonment or adverse
possession may more easily be proven.
One may still ask with much force why a distinction should
be made between easements in gross and profits in gross. The
answer seems to be purely practical and pragmatic. -. hQ more"mportaui-the +liee t th at it should be
ubiject to sale and transfer. Historically profits, particularly
commons of pasturage, wee of much importance. The protec-
tion afforded by the rules against surcharging indicates the
value of pasturage rights.26 And today profits, usually such
privileges as those of mining ore or other minerals or of taking
oil and gas, are even more valuable. Hence a profit in gross
will normally be held by an individual definitely ascertainable.
Unlike the easement in gross the desirability of the attribute
of assignability here outveighs the objection to the clog on title
on the servient interest. True the dividing line may at times
appear as an arbitrary and capricious standard. Some profits
are not worth saving. Some easements may be. But the neces-
sity for some fairly easily applied rule with predictable conse-
quences makes this arbitrary line desirable unless some other
test equally clear may be formulated.
strictions. Clark, op. cit. supra note 1; Clark, Party Wall Agrecmcnts ac
Real Covenants (1924) 37 HARv. L. Rsv. 301.
26 See cases cited supra notes 7-11.
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ARGUMENTS FOR ASSIGNABILITY---"SURCHARGING" AN EMIS.DNT
Recently two notable articles by learned and experienced prop-
erty teachers have covered this ground very thorougl-dy from
points of view different from that here stated. The first was
by Professor Vance 2 7 who most ably and forcefully prezents a
view designed to reconcile the cases and to afford a clearer
standard of division between assignable and non-assignable in-
terests. His idea, based on an analogy borrowed from the law
of the surcharging of profits, is that certain easements may be
thought of as surcharging the servient easement and should
therefore be non-assignable, while others which are admeasur-
able may be freely transferred. The second article was by
Professor Simes of Ohio State.-8 Professor Simes criticises
Professor Vance's conclusions, arguing that easements in gross
should be generally assignable.
Though I appreciate Professor Vance's search for a more apt
line of division between assignable and non-assignable interests,
and gladly acknowledge the stimulus of his original idea, I am
inclined to feel that the doubts raised by Professor Simes are
substantial. The analogy to the surcharging of profits is not
close and pointed. That rule applies to profits appurttizant not
to profits in gross; it deals with surcharging by dccds of con cy-
a~tee, while the rule as to easements is thought of in terms of
excessive user of the servient estate; it is designed to secure
a fair division of the natural products of the soil, not to pre-
vent use of the servient estate; and the result of surcharging
is to extinguish the profit, not to prevent its assignment.-a Sur-
charging seems misleading as applied to easements. As Pro-
fessor Simes suggests, the rule contended for is in effect
that unlimnited easements in gross are not assignable; limited
easements are. And the reason behind the rule is to prevent
excessive user of the servient estate.
To the rule thus stated I believe there are two serious objec-
tions. The first is that the real objection to assignable easements
in gross is not met. Here I must disagree also with Professor
Simes whose argument is based on his conclusion that the ob-
jection of excessive user is the one actually relied upon in the
cases.30 The objection he successfully answers. It does not seem
27 Comment (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 813.
28 Simes, op. cit. supra note 20. I am indebted to both theze learned ar-
ticles for many valuable citations.
29 Cases cited spra notes 7-11.
01 See Simes, op. cit. supra note 20, at 531: "The question then is: are there
any such reasons of policy (against alienability) in the case of ca -emcnts
in gross? The principal one advanced is that of the danger of surcharg-
ing the servient estate. That has already been dealt with. So far as the
writer knows, no other reasons of policy have been advanced by American
courts."
YALE LAW JOURNAL
to me, however, that this issue is emphasized in the decisions..1
The other objection, that of the clog on title, runs through not
merely the cases dealing with easements in gross but the prop-
erty cases in general.3 2 Easements are rarely drawn where the
use, as distinguished from the extent of the servient estate sub-
ject thereto, is limited. Thus the number of times per day a
way may be used is not ordinarily specified, although its width on
the servient estate often is. And while a way may be stated to
be a foot way and not a carriage way, it is the more limited
burden on the servient estate from the standpoint of the title
which makes the limitation of importance. Rarely will it matter
whether a way is used three times a day or six times if it must
be kept open, or whether water is drawn through a pipe con-
tinuously or only on alternate days, if the pipe must be allowed
to remain where it is. This is shown by another rule, the one
applied in the situation most nearly analogous to the surcharged
profit, that of the easement appurtenant. According to the well
settled rule, upon division of the dominant tenement, the ease-
ment passes as appurtenant to each part of such tenement, even
though the number of users is thereby vastly increased. 3 It
thus appears that in the cases "surcharging" the servient estate
by use is not considered an objectionable thing.
The other objection is that the proposed rule does not furnish
a workable standard. "Admeasurable easements," from various
examples given, seem to be those in any way limited, as an inch
and a quarter pipe, a right of way ten feet wide for pipes, a
right (privilege, etc.) to take out all the timber on a tract of
land, railway, telegraph and telephone lines, the right to divert
a certain amount of water, to lay and maintain a sewer, to dis-
play advertisements on certain walls and roofs, or to build and
maintain a logging boom in a stream upon the grantor's land. 4
31 The only reference looking in this direction I have discovered is one in
Boatman v. Lasley, supra note 24, at 618, which I read as being more
directed to the difficulties as to the title than any question of excessive
user. See also cases cited infra note 33.
32Supra note 24.
3 Siedler v. Waln, 266 Pa. 361, 109 Atl. 643, 8 A. L, R. 1363 (1920);
Phoenix Nat. Bank v. U. S. Security Co., 100 Conn. 622, 124 Atl. 640 (1924);
Newcomen v. Coulson, 5 Ch. D. 133 (1877) ; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 1346. The rule seems undisputed.
34 Comment (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 813, 818. The rule is suggested as one
not announced in the cases but actually reconciling the decisions. But
easements thus limited seem generally to have been held personal without
question in jurisdiction following the rule of nonassignability. Garrison
v. Rudd, 19 Ill. 558 (1858) (an alley 25 feet wide); Kershaw v. Burns, 91
S. C. 129, 74 S. E. 378 (1912) (limited to 10 or 11 feet); Field v. Morris,
88 Ark. 148, 114 S. W. 206 (1908),; Wooldridge v. Smith, 243 Mo. 190, 147
S. W. 1019 (1912) ; infra note 43; Ackroyd v. Smith, supra note 13 (a way
in a described road).
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This is a very extensive list. In view of it one may question
whether any easements in gross may properly be considered not
admeasurable. It is suggested that the unlimited way is not
admeasurable.35 But a way becomes fixed on the servient estate
either by designation or by usage without express designation,
and thereafter cannot be changed except by agreement.-" By
virtue of this rule an unlimited way is in effect just as limited as
one specified to be a certain number of feet, or a reasonable
width. Moreover, though "unlimited" in the sense that it may
be used by horses, wagons and automobiles, it would surely be
limited in some sense, as from use by airplanes for landing.37
As a practical matter, it would seem that under this rule essen-
tially every easement in gross should be held assignable.
This, as stated above, is Professor Simes' view.-5 He sets
forth a cogent and powerful argument in favor of assignability,
based in general upon the assignability of similar interests. But
in answering the arguments against "surcharging" the servient
estate, he does not give full weight to the practical difficulties of
the easement in gross as a clog on title.2 These practical diffi-
culties afford much basis for the traditional view of non-
assignability.
I am disposed therefore to conclude that the traditional atti-
tude of the courts towards easements in gross is on the whole
a more desirable one than that advocated by either learned
author. But whether their ultimate conclusions are fully ac-
cepted or not, the profession is indebted to both gentlemen for
their thorough-going analyses of a rather difficult problem.
TYPES OF EASEMENTS IN GROSS AND DECISIONS UPON
ASSIGNABILITY
Both learned authors suggest that the rule of non-assignability
is not as extensively followed as the cases would seem to indi-
351Ibid. 186.
36,Dudgeon v. Bronson, 159 Ind. 562, 64 N. E. 910 (1902); 2 TiFrAny,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 1335; see Ballard v. Titus, 157 Cal. 673, 6S3, 110
Pac. 116, 122 (1910).
37 Compare the remarks in Parks v. Bishop, 120 Mass. 340 (1S7); ef.
also Ballard v. Dyson, 1 Taunt. 279 (IS03); Shaughnezsey v. Leary, 162
Mass. 108, 38 N. E. 197 (1894).
3s Simes, op. cit. supra note 20.
29 He does, however, advance arguments on this point, based chiefly on
the doctrine of constructive notice from the recording of land titles. "For
the existence of such encumbrances is now easily ascertainable from the
records." It is true their existence is thus ascertained; but how to get rid
of them long after their purpose is fulfilled is not shown. In this connec-
tion Professor Simes cites my article on real covenants [Clarl, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 144J, as pointing out the tendency towards incrcased use
of various restrictions on land. I would urge, however, as suggested above,
that in each ease the desirability of the particular restriction must be
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cate. But this conclusion is reached in part at least by includ-
ing certain interests which it is believed are not analogous.
These are railroad rights of way, and pew and burial rights.
Railroad rights of way are often termed easements. They are,
however, more extensive interests carrying possession of the
premises. Cases which are called upon to analyze the interest
with care term them determinable or base fees.40 Moreover they
are not freely assignable. Unless used for railroad purposes the
interest where obtained by condemnation will cease; where ob-
tained by purchase usually the fee is obtained outright. A rail-
road or other utility cannot transfer its business to another com-
pany without consent of the state.41 The railroad right of way
is therefore a special peculiar interest subject to its own rules.
A similar statement may be made concerning pew 42 or burial
rights.43 These depend so much on the rules laid down by the
governing association or body and agreed to by holders of such
rights that generalizations concerning them are dangerous.
Without attempting to determine just the nature of the interest
involved, it would seem that where a church or a burial associa-
tion and its members all agree to a plan involving the trans-
ferability of rights there is no occasion for the law to interfere.
Obviously the title difficulties which render the ordinary ease-
balanced against the loss through a possible lessened marketability of the
land. See supra note 25..
40 See Western U. Tel. Co. v. Penn. R. R., 195 U. S. 540, 570, 25 Sup. Ct.
133, 141 (1904); cf. also Fitch v. N. Y., Prov. & B. R. R., 59 Conn. 414
(1890); Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Ry. v. Peet, 152 Pa. 488, 25 At]. 612
(1893); Abercrombie v. Simmons, 71 Kan. 538, 81 Pac. 208 (1905), 1 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 806 (1906); Citizens Electric Co. v. Susquehanna Boom Co.,
270 Pa. 517, 113 Atl. 559 (1921); Smith v. Hall, 103 Iowa 95, 72 N. W.
427 (1897); 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DomAiN (2d Ed. 1917) §§ 150, 192;
Note (1922) 8 VA. L. REv. 383; (1925) 20 ILL. L. REV. 183; (1926)
24 MICH. L. REV. 512; see also Sweet, op. cit. infra note 60, at 79-82;
Midland Valley R. R. v. Sutter, 28 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928);
cf. also Conn. Pub. Acts 1927, c. 167, cited infra note 53.
41 Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Evansville, 127 Fed. 187 (C. C.
D. Ind. 1903); Abbott vr. Johnstown, G. & K. H. R. R., 80 N. Y. 27 (1880);
Plummer v. Ches. & 0. Ry., 143 Ky. 102, 136 S. W. 162 (1911) ; see Thomas
v. Railrdad Co., 101 U. S. 71, 83 (1879); Notes (1893) 20 L. R. A. 737;
(1911) 31 L. R. A. (N. s.) 636; L. R. A. 1918 A 266.
42 ZOLLmAN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW (1917) 421, 424; Zollman,
Pew Rights in American Law (1916) 25 YALE L. J. 467; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra, note 2, at 1250-1254; (1894) 22 L. R. A. 206; Zernosky v. Kluchinsky,
278 Pa. 99, 122 Atl. 262 (1923); Note (1924) 22 MICH. L. REV. 463 (point-
ing out that pew rights have often been called personal property and con-
sidering them a "nondescript type of property").
43 See Simes, op. cit. supra, note 20, at 538; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note
2, at 1252-1254. In Wooldridge v. Smith, op. cit. supra note 34, a privilege
of burial in a lot 10 feet by 36 was held only a personal easement in gross.
See also ZOLLmAN, AMERICAN CIVIL CHURCH LAW (1917) 441-443; Zoll-
man, Church Cemeteries in the American Law (1916) 14 MICH. L. REV. 391.
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ment in gross objectionable are not present here, as they are
not in the railroad right of way cases. All these interests seem
of a special type throwing little light upon the question as it
relates to easements in gross.
The most usual type of such easements are ways. Here the
authorities seem fairly strong against assignabiity,14-a desir-
able result if the objections stated earlier in this essay are valid.
But admitting this result to be desirable it may be urged that all
other easements in gross should be assignable. Yet a glance at the
kinds of easements in gross listed by Professor Simes in his rather
complete review of the authorities would indicate how many
forms of easements in gross are very similar and probably sub-
ject to the same consideration as rights of way. Thus rights,
(privileges, etc.) of wharfage, right to maintain a boom, right
to use log sluice, ditch rights, and rights of way to remove tim-
ber would, it seems, fall in this class. 0  A somewhat different
result is suggested for rights to lay pipe lines, but the applica-
tion of another rule, namely, that an easement once laid out
should be considered limited to that location, suggests a doubt as
to some of the cases holding in favor of assignability.o In
fact the important Pipe Line Case in New Jersey,- 7 relied on as
a strong authority for assignability seems a harsh decision vio-
lating this latter rule. The decision permits another and in fact
an indefinite number of additional pipe lines to be laid 25 years
after the original grant and 13 years after the second of two
pipe lines was laid. 3
This leaves as a case about which there may be the most ques-
tion the easement to take water. From the practical standpoint,
this has many similarities to the profit, and in fact several cases
have considered the interest as a profit. 0 The objection to such
-4 This is admitted by Simes, op. cit. smp'a note 20, at 539, citing cases.
See also cases supra note 19.
45 Simes, op. cit. svpra note 20, at 537 :t seq. Some of these interests
were held assignable on various grounds, but query whether substantially
all are not subject to the objections to easements in gross in general.
46 Winslow v. City of Vallejo, 143 Cal. 723, 84 Pac. 191 (1906), 5 L. R.
A. (N..s.) 851 (1907); see also Sked v. Pennington Spring Water Co., 72
N. J. Eq. 599, 65 Atl. 713 (1907); Moorhead v. Snyder, 31 Pa. 514 (1853);
and cases cited supra note 36.
47 Standard Oil Co. v. Buchi, op. cit. svpra note 20; cf. Note (1907)
7 COL. L. REV. 536.
43 The nominal consideration paid ($5 down and a promise of $20 more)
would tend to indicate that the parties hardly contemplated such a dras-
tic interest rendering the servient estate practically useless to the servient
owner. Cf. Tidewater Pipe Co. v. Bell, s.pra note 19, where the decision
was properly put, as to pipes already laid, upon the ground of open and
notorious possession.
49 Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia Electric Co., 43J S. C. 151, 20
S. E. 1002 (1395) ; Clement v. Rutland Country Club, 94 Vt. 63, 103 Atl. ,-3
(1920); (1920) 30 YA.n L. J. 99; Hall v. Ionia, 38 Mich. 493 (18M/);
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a conclusion rests upon a somewhat technical difficulty of the
common law. Under that law, no ownership of water in streams
or percolating water is recognized until it has been ponded or
placed in containers where it is considered personal property.
Hence the easement to take water was, in the eyes of the law,
little more than an easement of way to get to the place where
it was proper to take the water." Whether such interests should
now be held alienable is fairly disputable. Obviously in many
cases the interest is sufficiently important, and such expenditures
have been made in contemplation of its assignability, that it
seems harsh to hold it merely personal. It would seem not out
of the way, should a court feel so disposed, to consider it now
more nearly analogous to the profit than to the usual easement
in gross and to permit its alienability.'
These general conclusions in substance support the common
law view of non-assignability.' 2 Unless a more desirable scheme
is developed by way of statute this, it is believed, is on the whole
the better view. The common law rule may at times lead to
anomalous results, but it is preferable to a rule which in no way
limits the transferability of these interests. Should a statute
be passed affecting the future creation of such interests it might
well provide for a limited assignability within a certain period
of time. Thus the Massachusetts statute controlling equitable
servitudes might perhaps serve as model. By this it is provided
that such servitudes shall last only for 30 years unless renewed
by a new grant."
Saratoga State Waters Corp. v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429, 125 N. E. 834 (1920);
(1920) 29 YALE L. J. 696; (1920) 18 MICH. L. REv. 549; see cases cited in
Simes, op. cit. supra note 20, at 537; of. Fudickar v. East Riverside Irriga-
tion Dist., 109 Cal. 29, 41 Pac. 1024 (1895); Myers v. Berven, 166 Cal. 484,
137 Pac. 260 (1913).
"0 Race v. Ward, 4 El. & Bl. 702 (1855) ; of. Note (1913) 13 COL. L. hay.
251; (1917) 30 HARV. L. REy. 297; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at
1236, 1390. The privilege of taking ice has been treated as a profit. Mit-
chell v. D'Olier, 68 N. J. L. 375, 53 At]. 467 (1902); Huntington v. Asher,
96 N. Y. 604 (1884).
51 In Talbot v. Joseph, 79 Ore. 308, 155 Pac. 184 (1916), a distinction is
drawn between easements in gross and water rights. Cf. (1920) 18 Miein.
L. REv. 549.
52 See to the same effect Sims, op. cit. supra note 24, at 322-329. An
excellent example of the desirable results of this rule is afforded by Thomas
v. Brooks, supra note 19. See (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 100.
- MAss. GEN. LAWS (19Z1) c. 184, § 23 applying to "conditions or re-
strictions, unlimited as to time;" Flynn v. Caplan, 234 Mass. 516, 126 N. E.
776 (1920). The statutes of some states provide for the creation of cer-
tain easements in gross, and elsewhere provide that all property interests
shall be alienable except as otherwise specifically provided. See CAL. CIV.
CODS (Deering, 1923) § 802; Simes, op. cit. supra note 20, at 540. These
statutes have been referred to as justifying holdings in favor of the assign-
ability of water privileges, but apparently the courts do not feel justified
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CHANGING EASEMENTS APPURTENANT TO EASEMENTS IN GROSS
The discussion above has indicated how the benefit of ease-
ments in gross differs in effect from the benefit of easements
appurtenant. This explains the rule that where the easement
is appurtenant, it cannot thereafter be reserved in gross by
agreement between the dominant owner and his grantee.G It is
obvious that the burden on the servient owner is materially al-
tered, a circumstance which should not be permitted without
his consent. A similar rule applies to profits.Ei There are dicta
to the effect that attempts thus to change the form of interest
result in its extinguishment." This results in a free gift to the
servient owner and seems unnecessary. There is much to be
said for the view that in spite of the reservation in the transfer
the easement passes as appurtenant to the dominant estate.-'
Such reservation might, however, be material upon the issue
whether the grantee might be considered to have abandoned his
easement.
EASEMENTS AND PROFITS DISTINGUISHED FROM POSSESSORY
INTERESTS
A final question arises as to how easements may be distin-
guished from other interests freely assignable. The question is
discussed in the Pipe Liize Case referred to above, 3 vhere it is
suggested that the pipe line privilege is more than an easement
and is in effect a possessory estate. A similar question often
arises in connection with leases or profits in mineral and oil
lands.59 The distinguishing feature in each case seems to be
in relying solely on these statutes and also emphasize the unique character
of such privileges. Cf. Fudickar v. East Riverside Irrigation Dist.; 'Myers
v. Berven, both supra note 49. By Conn. Pub. Acts 1927, c. 107, "case-
ments" for railroad and electric energy distribution purposes are made
assignable when so intended.
54 Cadwalader v. Bailey, s ,pra note 19; Blood v. Millard, 172 r1a,-z. 65,
51 N. E. 527 (1898) ; Reise v. Enos, 76 Wis. 634, 45 N. W. 414, 3 L. R. .
617 (1890) ; Wood v. Woodley, 160 N. C. 17, 75 S. E. 719 (1912), 41 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 1107 (1913) ; 2 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1223.
55 Drury v. Kent, s-upra note 11; Daniel v. Hanslip, svpna note 11; Baker
v. Kenney, mipra note 4; Hall v. Lawrence, 2 R. I. 218 (1852).
56 Cadwalader v. Bailey, supra note 19.
57 McKenna v. Brooklyn Union Elev. R. R., 184 N. Y. 391, 77 N. E. 615
(1906) (stating that there will be a resulting trust for the grantor of
moneys received for the invasion or destruction of such easements; but
query); McCullough v. Broad Exchange Co., 101 App. Div. 566, 92 N. Y.
Supp. 533 (1st Dept. 1905), af'd, 184 N. Y. 592, 77 N. E. 1191 (190);
Note (1905) 13 HARV. L. Ruv. 60S. See excellent discu=ssion in (190G) 20
HERv. L. Rsv. 136; cf. 2 TrFFAxY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1223.
us Standard Oil Co. v. Buchi, supra note 20; cf. also Tidewater Pipe Co.
v. Bell, supra note 19.
u Compare Grubb v. Bayard, szpra note 4; Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa.
475 (1858); Saltsburg Colliery Co. v. Trucks Coal Co., 273 Pa. 447, 123
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whether possession is granted or not. In both easements and
profits traditionally neither seisin nor possession of the servient
estate is given the dominant ownerA' But if the question turns
upon possession, narrow issues may arise. Is one in possession
where he has built a concrete driveway for his way over his
neighbor's land? Or where he has a pipe line an inch and a
quarter in diameter? Historically it would seem clear that the
seisin of the servient estate would not pass in such situation.
This appears to be as satisfactory an answer as is possible since
the line must be drawn some where. Either servient or domi-
nant owner is in possession; they are not considered to share
equally or to exercise the general rights of ownership together.
Unless the servient owner is definitely excluded from possession
of the servient estate, the interest should therefore be considered
only an easement or profit. The exclusion should be from a sub-
stantial portion of the servient estate. On this basis the pipe
line privilege would seem more properly considered an easement
than a possessory estate.61
II
THE ASSIGNABILITY 6F EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS
One of the best examples of the expansion of modern property
law to accommodate the demands of the realty market appears in
the development of the law of equitable servitudes, or restric-
tions upon the use of real property. The law of covenants has
been confused 'and restricted.-2 This is undoubtedly due in con-
siderable measure to the fact that only certain classes of cove-
nants, those in leases and those concerning party walls in par-
ticular, have been continuously of great importance to property
owners. On the other hand with the growth of cities and the
more crowded conditions of modern life, the desire of home own-
ers to secure desirable home surroundings has led to a demand
for land limited entirely to development for residence purposes.
This natural desire of householders has quite naturally been ex-
ploited by realtors and land companies so that the restricted resi-
Atl. 409 (1924) ; Heywood v. Fulmer, 158 Ind. 658, 32 N. E. 574 (1892), 18
L. R. A. 491 (1893); Scott v. Laws, 185 Ky. 440, 215 S. IV. 81 (1919);
(1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 226; SUmMERs, LAW OF OIL AND GAS (1927) c. 8.
60 See Sweet's test: the transfer by livery of seisin or only by grant.
CHALLis, RE.AL PROPERTY (3d. ed. 1911) 51; see also DIGBY, op. Cit. supra
note 15, at 183.
Sweet has a valuable article, The 'Easement' of Tunnelling (1916) 32 L.
Q. RE. 70, where he collects English cases dealing with this distinction and
criticizes the idea of an easement of tunnelling suggested in Southeastern
Ry. v. Associated Cement Mfrs., [1916] 1 Ch. 12.
61 Cf. Winslow v. City of Vallejo, supra note 46; Goodrich v. Burbank,
supra note 20; Simes, op. cit. supra note 20, at 531; cases cited by Sweet,
op. cit. supra note 60, at 75-79.
U2 Clark, op. cit. supra note 1; Clark, op. cit. supra note 25.
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dential property is now becoming the rule rather than the excep-
tion in or near our cities. The legal machinery to achieve this
end has been found in the main not in the ancient rules of ease-
ments or covenants but in the activities of the court of equity in
preventing fraud and unfair dealing. The basis of the modern
rules rests upon the equitable doctrine of notice, that he who
takes land with notice of a restriction upon it will not in equity
and good conscience be permitted to act in violation of the terms
of these restrictions.3
THEORIES AS TO THE RUNNING OF EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS
Though the general basis of these doctrines in the principles
governing courts of equity is well understood, there is some vari-
ation of opinion as to the specific application of these principles.
The two most thoroughly developed theories are first, that these
restrictions are enforced as contracts concerning land; C and
second, that they are enforced substantially as servitudes or
easements on land." It will be seen that the differences in these
two theories lead to quite important variations in decision of
several specific problems arising in connection with these in-
terests.
Under the first theory the contract which embodies the re-
03 Tulk v. DMoxhay, 2 Phillips 774 (1848). The rule is oftcn referred to
as "the doctrine of Tulk v. Dloxhay." See Jessel, BI. I., in London and
Southwestern Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562, 577 (18S2). Since the require-
ment of privity of estate so important in the law of real covenanto docz
not apply here (in fra note 68), one learned writer has spoken in this con-
nection of the "equitable principle of privity of conscience." Abbott,
Covenants in a Lease which Run with the Land (1921) 31 Y,=L L. J. 127,
131; quoted with approval in Rosen v. Wolff, 152 Ga. 578, 53, 110 S. E.
877, 880 (1922).
6" 2 TuFA. 'uY, op. cit. s pra note 2, at 1434-1438, citing cases; Stone, The
Equitable Rights an2d Liabilities of a Str a;gcr to a Contract (1918) 18
COL. L. Rov. 291; (1919) 19 ibid. 177; Ames, Specific Pciformance For and
Against Strangers to the Contract (1904) 17 Hum. L. Rcv. 174 (stating
the theory of unjust enrichment); Williams, Is A Disoci-or of Land Boumd
by Equities Incm'bent Upon the Disseisce (1906-1907) 51 Sol. J. 141, 155;
Giddings, Restrictions vpon the Use of Land (1892) 5 HMnv. L. Rov. 274;
(1888) 4 L. Q. REv. 119; (1904) 17 HARV. L. REV. 415; cf. BLUTiL.%:A,
EQurrTy (1909) 165-170.
- Pound, Progress of the Law, 191S-1919; Equitable Scrzituzdes (1920)
33 HARv. L. RLV. 813; Jessel, BI. R., in London and Southwestern Ry. v.
Gomm, supra note 63; Note (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 876; (1914) 23 ibfd.
201; G. L. CLARK, EQurY (1919) 118, 119; G. L. Clark, op. cit. infra
note 86; Scott, Te Rights of the Cestui que Trznst (1917) 17 CoL.
L. Rav. 269, 281, 285; Keasbey, Restrictions vpon the Use of Land
(1893) 6 H.iv. L. Rav. 280; PonrErmy, EQurry JUMSPRUDENCE (4th ed.
1918) §§ 1295, 1693; cf. (1921) 21 COL. L. REV. 826; (1926) 10 DIm.u;. L.
REv. 619; cases cited in 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1434; Note
(1922) 21 A. L. R. 1270, 1324.
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striction is specifically enforced against both the promisee and
those who take from him with notice. Those who may enforce
the obligation include not only the promisee but those who take
from him and also those in the neighborhood who may be con-
sidered beneficiaries of the contract. It also follows that there
may be an action for damages for breach of the contract, pos-
sibly in situations where specific enforcement is not possible.0
Though this view has the support of able writers and courts,
there seem to be serious difficulties, both theoretical and prac-
tical, to it. We have seen that the contract theory alone was
not sufficient to justify the running of real covenants. The con-
cepts of an agreement touching and concerning the land, and of
privity of estate were efnployed to justify such transfer.07 But
with these interests the requirements of real covenants are seem-
ingly to be repudiated, 8 and jurisdictions which frown upon
such covenants greet these interests with favor.01 But it may
be that the obligation can be considered to run to takers with
notice on the ground of estoppel. And the benefit may run to
assignees on the theory of the assignment of choses in action,
though it seems rather that as an appurtenance it will run with-
out separate mention.70  These objections which suggest that
the restriction, if not to be treated on the basis of the covenant
running with the land, is at least similar to the easement, pos-
sibly are not absolutely opposed to the contract theory. It is
difficult, however, to see even on the widest application of the
rule that third party beneficiaries to a contract may sue upon
it, how a justification is stated for the right of action freely
accorded various individuals.711 The well settled rule is that
66 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1436, 1437.
07 See Clark, op. cit. supra note 1.
68 That privity of estate is not necessary, see Parker v. Nightingale, 6
Allen 341 (Mass. 1863); Chesebro v. Moers, 233 N. Y. 75, 134 N. E. 842,
21 A. L. R. 1270 (1922); Ames, op. cit. supra note 64, at 183; of. authori-
ties cited infra notes 72, 73. In Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N. E.
946 (1885), Holmes, J., held that the restrictions must touch or concern
the land, and held further that restrictionis against competition did not
satisfy this requirement since they affected only the financial not the
"physical advantage" of the land; a distinction which seems hard to justify
whether or not the requirement be here applied. Cf. Clark, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 128, n. 26; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1430, 1431. Contra.
Natural Products Co. v. Dolese & Shepard Co., 309 Ill. 230, 140 N. E. 840
(1923); (1923) 33 YALE L. J. 447. Under the views suggested in Clarl,
op. cit. supra note 1, such restrictive agreements would necessarily "touch
and concern" the servient estate, and, unless intended to be in gros,,
some dominant estate also.
69 As in New York and England. Cf. Clark, op. cit. suppra note 1.
70 See Rogers v. Hosegood, [1900] 2 Ch. 388, 407; 2 TIFFANY, Op. cit.
supra note 2, at 1446; Note (1922) 21 A. L. R. 1281, 1290.
71 This difficulty is recognized by Tiffany. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note
2, at 1446-1449. See discussion in Note (1912) 12 COL. L. RVV. 158, 160.
EASEMENTS AND EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS 155
where land has been developed according to a neighborhood plan
of restriction, any one purchasing in reliance on such restric-
tion may sue any one else in the neighborhood taking with
notice, no matter when each purchased.72 So a prior taker may
sue a later taker, and vice versa, and on division of land one may
sue another though each claim through the same original grantee
or grantor. 3 It seems an unreal conclusion to say that when A
promised a realty development company not to conduct a busi-
ness upon Blackacre, a contract was made of which an intended
beneficiary was A's son, B, in a suit against A's daughter, C,
upon descent and division of Blackacre.
The practical results of this theory may be a failure to benefit
the persons whose interest actually should be protected,74 and
a possibility of giving a right where none should exast. The
latter point is illustrated by certain New York cases which have
held the restriction unenforceable because of changed conditions
of the neighborhood,7 but have suggested that an action for dam-
ages might lie on the contract. 0 In a late case, a purchaser was
held entitled to decline such a title on the ground that the pos-
sibility of such suit rendered the title not marketable.- The
72 The cases are discussed by the authors cited supra notes 04, 65, and
are collected in Note (1922) 21 A. L. R. 1281, 1006-1324. See also Note
(1924) 33 A. L. R. 676 and infra note 73; cf. Shoyer v. Mermelstein, 93
N. J. Eq. 57, 114 Atl. 788 (1921) ; (1921) 20 Micei. L. REY. 119.
73 Winfield v. Henning, 21 N. J. Eq. 18S (1870); Boyden v. Roberts, 131
Wis. 659, 111 N. W. 701 (1907); Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 20G
N. W. 496 (1925); (1926) 10 '1INN. L. Rnv. 619; see Pound, op. cit. suip a
note 65, at 819; Note (1922) 21 A. L. R. 12S1,1306,1324; (1921) 5 MuiNn. L.
REV. 486; Stone, op. cit. supra note 64, at 188, 189; cf. Korn v. Campbell,
192 N. Y. 490, 85 N. E. 6S7 (1908), 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1 (1912); King v.
Dickeson, 40 Ch. D. 596 (18S9); Dana v. Wentworth, 111 Mass. 291 (1873).
There is some apparent conflict, but this, it seems, goes solely to the question
whether such restrictions among grantees taking from one grantor should
be upheld as applied to a particular tract of land where there is not a
general neighborhood development. Tiffany suggests that in the former
case one part of the tract is prima facie not restricted in favor of another
part. 2 TFA ', op. cit. supra note 2, at 1446; cf. (1907) 7 COL. L. RLV.
623. It is doubtful if such a rule of presumption is a fair one. The facts
and circumstances of each case should be looked at to indicate the purpoZe
of the restriction; where it is to protect the development of the property,
it would seem that the restriction should be applied to all parts of the tract
itself.
74 Compare some of the cases referred to supra note 73.
75 See infra note 121.
M McClure v. Leaycraft, 183 N. Y. 36, 75 N. E. 901 (1905), 5 Am;tl. CAs.
45 (1907) ; Amerman v. Deane, 132 N. Y. 355, 30 N. E. 741 (1892) ; Jackson
v. Stevenson, 156 Blass. 496, 31 N. E. 691 (1892).
77 Bull v. Burton, 227 N. Y. 101, 124 N. E. 111 (1919) (a four to three
decision); see criticism by Pound, op. cit. supra note 65, at 820, 821; Note
(1918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 876; cf. Note (1919) 5 CoRN. L. Q. 98; Note (1919)
68 U. OF P.A. L. REV. 75; Note (1920) 20 CoL. L. Ra.M 76; Gcnshe v.
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real purpose of the restriction, to preserve the character of the
neighborhood, is no longer possible. Yet the encumbrance still
remains as a club which may be used against the realty owner.
RESTRICTION AS AN "EQUITABLE EASEMENT"
It seems preferable, therefore, to adopt the view of Dean
Pound and other learned writers 78 that these restrictions be con-
sidered as servitudes upon the land, similar at least to ease-
ments and profits. In general the benefit may be considered as
appurtenant to the land in the development scheme and to run
with it, or any parts thereof on division, as does an easement
on like division of the dominant estate.70 And the burden will
run to all takers of the land, there being mutual cross servi-
tudes.80 When such burdens are terminated by change in the
character of the neighborhood-now a recognized form of ter-
mination- 8 ' or otherwise, the interest definitely ceases. No pale
relics are left to trouble and not to benefit the property owners.
Mr. Herbert Tiffany and others have raised certain objections
to this view.8 2 It is believed that these are not wholly persua-
sive. He first refers to the requirement, applied in England,
at least, that there must be a dominant tenement. This rule is.
discussed below in connection with the question who may enforce
such restrictions.93 As there suggested it is in line with the
English hostility to easements in gross and it may well yield to
a different rule in this country. The other objection is that it
is inconsistent to recognize an easement enforceable "in equity"'
bt not "at law." This deserves some serious consideration but
in answer one may wonder whether such portions of the rule as
would deny recognition of the interest "at law" should not be
discarded. No reason seems apparent why these restrictions.
should now be considered merely "equitable" interests. It is
true that they were first enforced by courts of equity against
those taking with notice.8 4 It is true further that the only com-
pletely adequate remedy is, and is likely to remain, the equitable
remedy of injunction. But admitting this, the fact remains that
Jensen, 188 Wis. 17, 205 N. W. 548, (1925); (1926) 74 U. of PA. L. Rlv.
515; Isaacs v. Schmuck, 245 N. Y. 77, 156 N. E. 621 (1927) (restrictiona
against the sale of liquor render the title not marketable notwithstanding
the Prohibition Amendment; decision perhaps justifiable on the ground that
the restrictions were broader than the Amendment).
78 Supra note 65.
7 9 Supra note 33.
so Compare the party wall easements. Clark, op. cit. supra note 25.
81 See infra note 121.
82 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1434, 1435; of. Stone, op. cit. supra
note 64.
83 Infra -p. 160.
84 Supra note 63.
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such restrictions under our American recording systems become
encumbrances indistinguishable from recognized easements such
as negative easements of view.65
It is difficult to see, in fact, why the analogy is not substan-
tially complete. Damages seem to be a proper even if not ade-
quate remedy for infringement, and the restriction may so far
be an encumbrance on the title as to render it unmarketable at
law as well as in equity.1 It is clear that damages may perhaps
be given on the theory that the restriction may also constitute
a covenant running with the land.-' But there is authority that
the restriction is enforceable against adverse possessors with
notice,- a result quite satisfactory but one somewhat inconsist-
ent with its treatment as merely a covenant. 0 It is true that
these interests both as to benefit and burden embrace more ter-
ritory than do most easements. But the intention being clear,
there seems no theoretical objection to mutual easements attach-
83 As in Cadwalader v. Bailey, supra note 19; cf. Stone, op. cit.mpra note
64, at 292, n. 3. These restrictions are often called "negative easements."
Compare Jessel, BI. R., in London & Southwestern Ry. v. Gomm, spma
note 63, and authorities cited supra note 65.
sr Cf. Bull v. Burton, supra note 77. It has been held in Missouri that
express words of covenant are necessary. Zinn v. Sidler, 263 'Mo. OSO, 187
S. W. 1172 (1916); O'Blalley v. Smith, 203 S. W. S49 (Mo. App. 1919).
See criticism by Pound, op. cit. sapra note 65, at 810, saying that the weight
of authority is contra; cf. Parker v. Nightingale, supra note 6S; Giddingz,
op. cit. supra note 64, at 277; G. L. Clark, Equitable Scr itdcs (1917) 1G
Mic. L. Rav. 90, 97; Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N. Y. 105 (1862).
8 That a "negative" running covenant (restricting preVlcgc} of u e) may
be upheld "at law" is well settled. See Clark, op. cit. sipra note 1; of.
Cockson v. Cock, Cro. Jac. 125 (1606); Amcrican Strawboard Co. v. Halde-
man Paper Co., 83 Fed. 619 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897); Bald Eagle Valley R. R.
v. Nittany Valley Ry., 171 Pa. 284, 33 Atl. 239 (1895); Gilmer v. MNobile
& M. Ry., 79 Ala. 569 (1SS5) ; Parrott v. Atl. & N. C. R. R., 165 N. C. 295,
81 S. E. 34S (1914), Ann. Cas. 1915D 265; Thruston v. Mlinke, 32 Md. 487
(1870); cf. also cases cited supra notes 76, 77. Dean Ames' suggestion to
the contrary (Ames, op. cit. supra, note 64, at 178) is not general American
law, though it may accord with the English view and with that of some
American jurisdictions opposed to the running of the burden of covenants
with estates in fee. Cf. also G. L. Clark, op. cit. sup- note 86, at 9 1.
Ss Re Nisbet & Potts' Contract, [1905] 1 Ch. 391, af'd, [1906] 1 Ch. 380.
This view is approved by Professor Bordwell, Disscisin aizd Advcroc
Possession (1924) 33 YALu L. J. 285, 292. See also Note (1905) 18 HAnv.
L. Rav. 608; Williams, op. cit. saepra note 64; cf. AIArLAD, op. cit. s,'pra.
note 64, at 168-170; Sweet, Title by Adverse Possession (1907) 19 Jun. R rv.
67. But cf. 2 TEFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1438; Scott, op. cit. s,1pra
note 65, at 285; G. L. Clark, op. cit. supra note 86, at 93; Stone, op. cit. -upra
note 64, at 307; cf. also Blander v. Falcke, [1891] 2 Ch. 554.
s9 See Clark, op. cit. supra note 1; also cases cited supra note 88. Pro-
fessor Bordwell argues also for a more extensive running of covenants than
merely with the estate in the land, as is the traditional view. See Bordwell,
op. cit. supra note 88, at 292.
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ing to land in this way. The mutual cross easements of the
party wall furnish an analogy.90
FORM OF LANGUAGE CREATING THE. RESTRICTION
The above conclusion that this restriction should be treated in
substance as an easement indicates the form of language in which
it should most properly be couched. There seems to have been
some tendency to employ the language of contract or of condi-
tion. Both seem unfortunate. The contract form emphasizes
the personal nature of the ihterest which is probably contrary
to the purpose of restriction. It may lead to a conclusion that
only the grantor is bound in damages and that the land itself is
unrestricted or on the other hand that damages are to be col-
lected when the land encumbrance has long become valueless. 1
As a condition a right of re-entry will be left in the grantor
(usually a realty development company) thus creating a cloud
on title, perhaps again long after a complete change in the char-
acter of the neighborhood in favor of one who has no real inter-
est in the premises. 2 But if the restriction is stated merely
as a servitude binding upon the granted land in favor of all other
land of a certain described area, these difficulties are avoided.
A serious conflict exists as to whether the servitude should be
considered as an interest in land so that a writing is necessary
for its creation. Mr. Herbert Tiffany, for example, inclines to the
view that such interests being purely equitable (and to this
extent personal) need not be in writing 3 It is difficult to see
why they do not affect the land pretty substantially and why
they are not within the policy of the statute. Again following
the analogy of easements it would seem that a writing should
be considered necessary 94 unless there is estoppel or part per-
formance.9 5
90 See (1909) 9 COL. L. REV. 74; Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 300,
nn. 15, 16; of. Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 13 N. W. 317 (1911),
36 L. R. A. (N. s.) 890 (1912); (1926) 10 MINN. L. Rsv. 619. For other
similarities under the Rule against Perpetuities see Clark, op. cit. 'upra
note 25, at 314, and in methods of termination see infra p. 162. As to
the undesirability in general of a continued separation of law and equity
see CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) e. 2.
91 See supra p. 155; Bull v. Burton, supra note 77.
92 The fact that a right of re-entry for condition broken is reserved does
not necessarily operate to prevent the condition from being also treated as a
restriction. Weil v. Hill, 193 Ala. 407, 69 So. 438 (1915); 2 TirVANY,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 1427.
93Ibid. 1432; Thornton v. Schobe, 79 Colo. 25, 243 Pae. 617 (1926);
(1926) 24 MicH. L. REV. 854; Johnson v. Mt. Baker Park Pres. Church,
113 Wash. 458, 194 Pac. 536 (1920); (1921) 19 MICH. L. Rnv. 751; Hall v.
Solomon, 61 Conn. 476, 23 Atl. 876 (1892); of. (1922) 7 COL. L. REV. 622.
94 Ham v. Massasoit Real Est. Co., 42 R. 1. 293, 107 Atl. 205 (1919), noted
by Dean Pound, op. cit. supra note 65, at 817; (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 580;
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ENFORCEMENT OF AFFIhMATIM, OBLIGATIONS
The English cases hold directly that only negative restric-
tions will be enforced in equity and that agreements calling for
affiamative acts will not be enforced against takers with noticeP3
In the American cases there seems to be some conflict with at
least considerable apparent tendency to follow the English ruleP7
On the other hand several text writers have strongly urged the
desirability of enforcing all agreements, whether affirmative or
negative, where the equitable remedy is the only adequate one.0
It seems clear that this problem cannot be considered apart
from the question how far covenants shall be permitted to run
with the land. If a fully developed scheme of running cove-
nants, such as is suggested in an earlier essay,9 is permitted,
there will be numerous cases where the doctrine of covenants
and restrictions overlap, and where the plaintiff should have a
remedy under either doctrine., " There is under modern proce-
dure no occasion to limit the remedy on a running covenant to
damages, but the more complete equitable remedies should be
allowed.""" But where the local policy is distinctly against the
(1920) 19 MicH. L. Ruv. 219; Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Ma.-. 33$0, 100 X. E.
622 (1913); Davis v. Robinson, (1925) 1S9 N. C. 5S9, 127 S. E. 07 (1925);
Pierson v. Canfield, 272 S. W. 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); (192') .
L. Q. 72; Note (1920) 5 A. L. R. 448.
- Phillips v. West Rockaway Land Co., 226 N. Y. 507, 121 X. E. S7
(1919); (1919) 33 HARv. L. Ruv. 112; (1920) 6 VA. L. REv. 222. So there
is a conflict whether such restriction is property and whether damages mu't
be given on its taking in eminent domain proceedings. Cf. Flynn v. Xcw
York, W. & B. Ry., 218 N. Y. 140, 112 N. E. 913 (1916), and Riverbanl:
Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N. E. 214 (1917), with
Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N. E. 505 (1915);
see 2 TiF Ny, op. cit. s-ra note 2, at 142S; (1907) 21 Lav. L. R.'.
139; Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 113 Atl. 245 (Conn. 1928).
-' Haywood v. Brunswick Permanent Benefit Bldg. Soc., L. Ri. 3 Q. B. D.
403 (181); Hall v. Ewin, 37 Ch. D. 74 (13S7). But ef. HolmcZ v. Buelklcy,
Prec. Ch. 39 (1691).
97 Miller v. Clary, 210 N. Y. 127, 103 N. E. 1114 (1913), L. R. A. 1915E
222, Ann. Cas. 1915B 872. Tiffany states that the great majority of agree-
ments enforced have been restrictive although he citer zome eae: where
affirmative obligations have been upheld. 2 TIFFAY, op. cit. -npa note 2,
at 1429, 1430.
9S Pomeroy, loc. cit. supra. note 65; cf. Stone, op. cit. xzqpar note 61, at
303-307; G. L. Clark, op. cit. szpra note S6, at 100; Giddingo, op. cit. szq-a
note 65, at 279; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14")0. But sce Amcv,
op. cit. supra note 64, at 176; Scott, op. cit. supra note 65, at 291, n. 19, 2S5.
-' Clark, op. cit. svp a note 1.
loc C.f. cases supra note 87.
101 The equitable remedy is at times awarded where the remedy of dam-
ages is said to be inadequate. Cf. Thruston v. Minke, szp2-a note S7 (where
the burten would run); Countryman v. Deck, 13 Abb. N. C. 110 (0. Y.
1883); Randall v. Latham, 36 Conn. 48 (S69)); Hollander v. Central 'Metal
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encumbrances of running covenants (as it is in England and
New York and to a less extent, in other jurisdictions),12 it would
seem inconsistent to adopt a contrary policy as to interests sub-
stantially identical, if not potentially more burdensome. On
the whole 'it would seem desirable to consider these interests
as restricted to easements, to uphold them only as negative re-
strictions, and to allow the affirmative runniig encumbrances
to wait upon the development of a more enlightened policy to-
wards the covenant running with the land.U3
WHO MAY SUE TO ENFORCERESTRICTIONS
We have already seen that the benefit of the servitude may run
rather widely in favor of all property owners of a neighbor-
hood. 04 May the benefit, however, remain in gross while the bur-
den runs? The English courts have held that it may not, 0
and have stuck to this decision in later cases even though its
harsh results have occasionally been regretted 10  This result
is in general accord with their attitude of opposition to ease-
ments in gross, 10 7 and it further finds some support in the stated
rule of equity that only a property interest is protected, and
that, too, where actual or threatened damage is shown.1 8 In
the United States the English rule has had support,""' but at
least one important jurisdiction has decided squarely to the con-
trary in a decision supported by some text writers but criticised
by many. 10
& Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 71 Atl. 442 (1908); see Clegg v. Hands, 44 Ch.
D. 503, 518, 523 (1890).
102 Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 144.
103 Ibid.; of. Professor Bordwell's suggestion of treating covenants also
as easements. Bordwell, op. cit. supra note 88, at 292.
' 0 4 See supra notes 72, 73. In such case a release by the original promisco
is ineffective. Armstrong v. Leverone, 105 Conn. 464, 136 AtI. 71 (1927);
Muller v. Weiss, 91 N. J. Eq. 29, 108 Atl. 768 (1919).
105 Formby v. Barker, [1903] 2 Ch. 539.
20G London County Council v. Allen, [1914] 3 K. B. 642 (following the
modern authorities with reluctance); see (1914) 30 L. Q. REV. 388; 13
Mich. L. R. 150; Chambers v. Randall, [1923] 1 Ch. 149; Note (1924) 157
LAw TimiEs 188. In, Ives v. Brown, [1919] 2 Ch. 314, the personal repre-
sentative and the devisee of the covenantee were allowed to join. See (1924)
18 MicH. L. REv. 435. An enforceable oral contract of purchase has been
held sufficient as a dominant tenement. Bessinet v. White, [1926] 1 D. L. R.
95; (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 775; (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 366; of. (1922)
36 HARv. L. REV. 107 (a "business" as a dominant tenement).
1O7Supra note 13.
208 See caseg cited supra notes 105, 106; infra note 109. Of. Stone, op.
-t. supra note 64, at 314, 315; G. L. Clark, op. cit. supra note 86, at 97.
109 Los Angeles University v. Swarth, 107 Fed. '798 (C. C. A. 9th, 1901);
Foreman v. Sadler's Exc'rs, 114 Md. 574, 80 Atl. 298 (1911); Gonung v.
Harvey, 79 N. J. Eq. 57, 80 Atl. 955 (1911).
10 Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N. E. 194 (1913), aff'g 170 Ill. App.
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In earlier essays reasons were advanced for believing that in
cases where the intent was clear, the benefit should be allowed
to remain in gross while the burden passes with a servient estate.
This is in accordance with the American attitude towards ease-
ments in gross I" and also covenants in gross.12  Furthermore,
there seems no reason why equity should not act to protect such
interest when validly created as it does the easement in gross.
Some well reasoned cases point out that the processes of the
courts should be available to prevent fraudulent or improper
conduct where the plaintiff is under only a moral or other non-
legal obligation to seek protection for his neighbors."3 Here
such a case may arise where the neighbors either have no rights
or their rights are not clear. The case will not occur often, for
ordinarily the burden will be clearly appurtenant, in which event
it should rarely, if ever, be held also in gross to the original
promisee. But in the occasional case it may prove a desirable
right as against a person who is acting with obvious unfairness
towards his neighbors. The objections stated as an absolute
rule of law seem unsubstantial and of a technical and academic
character.1"'
RUNNING OF THE BURDEN
The burden of these servitudes is enforced against those who
take with notice or who are not purchasers for value."25 Under
our American recording system, the record is, therefore, most
important as an element in the running of the burden. The
same rule necessarily applies to easements, profits, covenants
and other encumbrances. The rule is well settled that a pur-
572 (1912). The case is criticised in (1914) 9 ILL. L. REV. 58; (1916) 11
ILL. L. Rnv. 283; (1914) 27 HARV. L. REV. 493; G. L. Clark, op. cit. supra
note 86, at 97. See also 2 TFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1441. But cf.
Stone, op. cit. supra note 64, at 313; Clark, op. cit. supra note 1. Dean
Stone gives Borough Bill Posting Co. v. Levy, supra note 16, as in accord,
though this is often considered as a typical easement in gross. See szpra
notes 16, 17. The point was not decided in St. Stephen's Church v. Church
of Transfiguration, 201 N. Y. 1, 94 N. E. 191 (1911), alTg 130 App. Div.
166, 114 N. Y. Supp. 623 (1st Dept. 1909).
111 Supra notes 77, 73.
112 Clark, op. cit. supra note 1.
113 Brett v. Cooney, 75 Conn. 338, 53 Atl. 729 (1902); Morrow v.
Ursini, 96 Conn. 219, 113 Atl. 338 (1921); Note (1903) 16 HAM. L. REV.
509; see Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 131, n. 43.
114 One objection is based upon the rule that change in the condition of the
dominant land marks the end of the restriction. Infra note 61. It is claimed
that a fortiori where there is no dominant land the restriction should not
be enforced. Nevertheless, it would seem that the same rule of termination
may be applied whether there is a dominant tenement or not.
-5 Hence Professor G. L. Clark states that an adverse possessor of the
servient land should be bound even though he has no notice. G. L. ClarL,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 93; cf. Note (1905) 18 HAnv. L. REV. 603.
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chaser takes with notice from the record only of encumbrances
in his direct chain of title. Hence in the absence of actual notice,
before or at the time of his purchase, an owner of land in the
neighborhood is only bound by the restrictions if they appear
in some deed of record in the conveyances to himself and his
direct predecessors in. title.11o In this connection some discus-
sion has occurred where one makes an agreement concerning
any property he may later acquire in the neighborhood. It
seems clear that this agreement, even if recorded, is not in the
chain of title of any after acquired property of the promisor
and, hence, that there is not notice of it from the record. In a
leading New York case there were apparent suggestions in the
opinion contrary to this, but these were probably inadvertent
since the decision itself properly rests upon the actual fraud of
the defendant, the wife of the original promisor.117
In an earlier essay it was pointed out that the burden of such
a restriction may be in gross while the benefit runs. These are
usually cases of personal promises not to compete.18
TERMINATION OF RESTRICTIONS
It seems clear that all the rules as to the ending of easements
and profits, including those as to abandonment by the dominant
owners, should apply to these interests.21  In addition, two other
rules have been emphasized by courts in refusing to enforce
servitudes. One is where the plaintiff has been guilty of laches
in pressing his suit or has himself violated the restrictions. 120 The
other is where because of the changed conditions in the neigh-
borhood, not occasioned by the defendants, the preservation of
the original character of the property is no longer possible.1 21
116 Hancock v. Gumm, 151 Ga. 667, 107 S.'E. 872 (1921) ; (1921) 21 COL.
L. RE V. 826; Beetchenow v. Arter, 45 R. I. 133, 119 Atl. 758 (1923) ; Glorieux
v. Lighthipe, 88 N. J. L. 199, 96 Atl. 94 (1915); Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass.
546 (1876); 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1439. Where the instru-
ment is not a conveyance, but merely an agreement, though appearing prop-
erly in the chain of title, a subsequent purchaser is held to have constructive
notice, unless by the local law the agreement is not entitled to be recorded.
Ibid. 1440.
1171 Lewis v. Gollner, 129 N. Y. 227, 29 N. E. 81 (1891); cf. G. L. Clark,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 98.
11s Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 129; National Union Bank v. Segur,
39 N. J. L. 173 (1877); Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136 (N. Y. 1837).
The Massachusetts rule is apparently contra. See supra note 68.
119 See Clark, op. cit. supra note 25, at 313, 314; G. L. Clark, op. cit. supra
note 86, at 104.
120 Loud v. Pendergast, 206 Mass. 122, 92 N. t. 40 (1910); Gage v.
Schavoir, 100 Conn. 652, 124 AtI. 535; Schwarz v. Holycross, 83 Ind. App.
658, 149 N. E. 699 (1925). See law review notes cited infra note 121.
121 See cases collected in Note (1928) 54 A. L. R. 812-837; see also *cases
cited sup3ra notes 76, 77; infra note 122; Pound, op. cit. supra note 65, at
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These are often spoken of as an application of the theory that
equitable remedies are a matter of grace, not of right. -2 Such
theory is at least a partial explanation of the way in which the
principles of equity developed. It has, however, great disad-
vantages as a general theory of property law. It tends to un-
settle property rights, since the result in each case will depend
on a particular judge's views of justice. The decisions under
the so called "balancing of the equities" doctrine as applied in
granting or refusing an injunction against committing a nuisance
indicate how variable such justice is. And it tends to make the
outcome depend on a comparison of the value of the interests of
plaintiff and defendant, and thus effects a preference to large
property holders before the law, which has distinct social dis-
advantages.23 In our present problem such explanation has the
added disadvantage of leading a court to believe that the now
useless restriction may still be of validity "at law" and remain
an encumbrance on title.124 It seems much better to treat these
as recognized methods of termination of restrictions both "in
equity" and "at law." They are similar in general character
to the abandonment of an easement and have at times been
819, 821; Note (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 876; Postley v. Kafka, 213 App. Div.
595, 211 N. Y. Supp. 382 (1st Dept. 1925); (1926) 35 YuE L. J. 515;
(1926) 12 VA. L. REV. 502; Note (1914) 14 CoL. L. REV. 433. See extensive
provisions under the new English Property Acts. 15 Geo. V. c. 20, § 84
(1925); Bordwell, English Property Reform and Its Acmrican Aspccts
(1927) 37 YALE L. J. 173, 207. By Statute in Massachusetts such restric-
tions, unlimited as to time, run only for thirty years. MlAss. GEN. LAWS
(1921) c. 184, § 23; supra, note 53.
122 Forstmann v. Joray Co., 244 N. Y. 22, 154 N. E. 652 (1926); Note
(1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 518; Bauby v. Krasow, 139 At. 50S (Conn. 1927),
criticised in (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 832; see also (1928) 41 HARv. L. Rnv. 302.
- 3 This familiar problem in the law of nuisance has been often discussed.
Note (1922) 36 HARv. L. REV. 211; (1926) 39 HAnv. L. REV. 1098; (1928)
22 ILL. L. REV. 775; Note (1923) 9 CoRN. L. Q. 63; (1923) 23 COL. L. REV.
684; (1922) 20 MIcH. L. REV. 799; (1925) 23 BlICH. L. REV. 406. Compare
with these discussions Comment (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 96; Note (1927) 6
TEx. L. REv. 83; (1925) 11 VA. L. REv. 403, and McClintoeck, Discretion to
Deny Injunction Against Trespass and Nuisance (1928) 12 MIMI. L. Rsv.
565. The latter authorities assert that other matters than comparative
values may motivate the courts in withholding injunctions. It seems,
however, that where some definite recognized principle of equity, e.g., the
doctrine of laches, is not relied on the court tends to appeal to general
considerations not capable of definite evaluation and eventually relies
largely, if not wholly, upon the more specific evidence of size and value
of investment of the parties. Cf. (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 832, upra note
122, as to defendant's "intrenchment behind considerable expenditure,"
citing Stewart v. Finkelstone, 206 Blass. 28, 92 N. E. 37 (1910).
l24See Bull v. Burton, supra note 77, and the criticism of Pound, op. cit.
aupra note 65, at 820, 821, of this ease and cases cited supra note 70.
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spoken of as implied conditions of the original grant.125 Since
these doctrines are based on obvious common sense, and in line
with the general policy of disposing of encumbrances on title,
especially where no longer of general usefulness,1O they should
receive the same recognition in property law accorded the doc-
trine of abandonment.
-25 See Note (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 876, 877; 2 TIFFANY, Op. cit. slpra
note 2, at 1458.
126 See supra note 24. Compare the general rule that restrictions must be
strictly construed. Easterbrook v. Hebrew Ladies' Orphan Society, 85 Conn.
289, 82 Atl. 561 (1912); Voorhees v. Blum, 274 Ill. 319, 113 N. E. 593
(1916); (1917) 1 MINN. L. REv. 182; Pierson v. Rellstab Bros., 219 App.
Div. 552, 219 N. Y. Supp. 404 (2d Dept. 1927) ; Bowers v. Fifth Ave. & 77th
St. Corp., 125 Misc. 343, 209 N. Y. Supp. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Griswold
R. & H. Corp. v. West End Ave. Corp., 125 Misc. 30, 209 N. Y. Supp. 764
(Sup. Ct. 1925); Muller v. Cavanaugh, 94 N. J. Eq. 619, 121 Atl. 339
(1923) ; Small v. Parkway Auto Supplies, Inc., 258 Mass. 30, 154 N. E. 321
(1926); of. Jones v. Mulligan, 121 At]. 608 (N. J. Eq. 1923); (1923) 22
MICH. L. REV. 63.
